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JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE INDIVIDUAL AND LABOR LAW
CHARLES WM. DORMAN*

Thefundamenialconsiderationin laborrelationsmust be the welfare of
the individual I
INTRODUCTION

In 1946 William J. Brennan, Jr. expounded this view before a
meeting of a New Jersey bar association. Ten years later he was seated
as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. In the
more than quarter-century which has followed that seating, Justice
Brennan has universally been characterized as a liberal and, through
his decisions, has oftentimes been the champion of individual rights.
In consideration of his comments to the bar, his judicial philosophy is
certainly not surprising. What is surprising however, is that at the time
he made his proposal to the bar association he was a management attorney.2 He even noted that management might not agree with his proposed formula for calming the turbulent labor problems of that period.
It is the purpose of this article to explore Brennan's intriguing
formula and to determine how and if it has been reflected in the national labor policy which he has helped to shape during the past quarter-century. This article discusses labor law from the often overlooked
perspective of the individual worker who is caught in the middle of
labor-management relations, and reveals a definite pattern in Brennan's approach to labor law problems where the outcome of a case directly impacts upon an individual. It is obvious that some areas of
labor law, such as antitrust, hot cargo agreements, and preemption, do
not readily lend themselves to this analysis. However, other areas including internal union affairs, judicial access and attorneys' fees, employment discrimination, protected union activities and the use of
economic weapons frequently involve a consideration of the rights of
* A.A. & B.A., University of Florida; J.D. 1973 Spessard Holland College of Law, University of Florida; L.LM. (with highest honors) 1980, National Law Center, The George Washington
University.
1. Brennan, Formulaeforthe Settlement ofLabor Disutes, 69 N.J.L.J. 145, 147 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Brennan].
2. Brennan's firm represented Western Electric, Jersey Bell Telephone, Phelps Dodge, Celanese Corporation, American Hair & Felt, and the Association of General Contractors of New
Jersey in labor matters. J. FRANK, THE WARREN COURT, 113-32 (1964) (hereinafter cited as
FRANK].
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the individual worker. Focusing on these topics, the article will explore
how Justice Brennan's concern for the individual is reflected in his labor law opinions.
At the onset it is appropriate to note what this article is not. It is
not intended, nor does it attempt, to educate concerning the general
principles of labor law. In short, it is not a restatement of that area of
the law. Rather it is an examination of but one Justice's approach to
labor law problems. However, as the author of more "labor law" opinions than any other justice, much of what Justice Brennan has written
is the law. Furthermore, since the article focuses on Brennan's
formula, it is appropriate and helpful to briefly examine Brennan's
background, and essential to highlight his formula.
A BiographicalSketch
Justice Brennan's father came from Ireland in 1880, and upon taking a job in a brewery as a coal shoveler he became a member of the
Stationary Firemen's Union. He was critical, though, of the way the
union was run, without an accounting of union dues. Consequently, he
campaigned for union reforms, became its business agent and allowed
its books opened for public inspection. Later he served as the business
agent for the International Brotherhood of Engineers and Oilers. From
that position he was appointed to the police board for Newark, and
eventually was elected as a police commissioner and also as the director
3
of public safety.
Justice Brennan was born on April 25, 1906, in Newark, New
Jersey. He received his primary and secondary schooling there, attending both parochial and public schools. 4 He worked a variety of odd
jobs: a delivery boy for a dairy and a butcher; a change maker on the
trolly; and a gas station attendant, changing tires and washing cars.
His first white collar work appears to have been his secretarial duties
for his college fraternity and the tutoring he did while at the University
of Pennsylvania, 5 where in 1928 he received a bachelor of science degree in economics. 6 Three years later he was awarded a bachelor of
7
laws degree from Harvard Law School.
3. Id. at 115.
4. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate on the Nomination of
William Joseph Brennan, Jr., of New Jersey, To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 35 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
5. Frank, supra note 2, at 115-16.
6. Hearings, supra note 4.
7. Id.
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Following law school, Brennan was admitted to the New Jersey
bar, and engaged in a general practice until 1937. At that time a large
part of his practice became representing employers in the labor relations field, and continued so until entering the Army in 1942.8 During
the War he was given labor relations responsibilities as the "Chief of
the Labor Branch, Army Services Forces," and tasked with the job of
bringing defense plants to maximum production. Leaving the Army as
a colonel, he was awarded the Legion of Merit. He then returned to his
old law firm as a partner. 9
Brennan began his judicial career in January, 1949, when he was
appointed as a trial judge in Jersey City, New Jersey. He was elevated
to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court in September, 1950,
and to the New Jersey Supreme Court in March, 1952. On October 16,
1956, he was nominated by President Eisenhower to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, following the retirement of Justice
Minton.' 0
Brennan's Formula
In 1946 when Brennan addressed a meeting of a New Jersey bar
association, labor-management relations were governed by the National Labor Relations Act, which had been passed in 1935." The
problem as Brennan saw it was that the Act had given organized labor
a panoply of economic weapons which it was free to use, virtually unchecked. Brennan complained, "Rights to organize and to compel collective bargaining were written large into the Act, but nowhere appears
a mention of union or worker responsibility. Responsibilities were reserved entirely for management."' 2 It was this imbalance in the Act
which his formula was designed to remedy.
He began by saying that not all strikes are bad, that "industrial
democracy inevitably must have some of them when free collective bargaining doesn't resolve differences," and that strikes generally "are not
too great a penalty to pay for industrial freedom. The alternative is
solution of disputes by government fiat and that is . . . destructive of
the interests of management and worker alike."' 13 He continued:
Free enterprise succeeds only when each group furthering its corn8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id at 36; see note 2.
FRANK, supra note 2, at 117-18.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 36. FRANK, supra note 2, at 121.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Act or NLRA].
Brennan, supra note i, at 147.
Id. at 145.
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mon aims practices a high degree of self government, self-discipline
and self reliance and accepts it responsibilities not wrongly to invade
or trample upon the rights of other groups. [When one group abandons these principles] then the government has stepped in and has
legislated stringent controls to curb those abuses . . . blunt[ing] the
claws of the strong and hasten[ing] the remedy by giving clubs to the
weak. 14

He added however, that this is a proper function. "Governmental regulations should be used to protect the weak from the strong and to
prevent excesses by any group which invades the rights of others."' 5
Having recognized the right of workers to organize as well as the
need for government to protect that right, Brennan turned his attention
to a specific solution for the imbalance, recognizing that times had
changed since 1935. His proposed formula included the prohibition of
supervisors joining the same union which represented the workers they
supervised;16 penalizing strikes called in violation of a contract; prohibiting unions from coercing and intimidating workers to join their
8
ranks, 17 and from discriminating on the basis of race, creed or color;'
and expansion of the National Labor Relations Board's (Board) authority to "determine when picketing constitutes unfair labor practices,
or when the manner of conducting strikes or organizational activity
generally constitutes such practices, and to issue cease and desist orders
in such cases." ' 19

Central to Brennan's formula, however, was the consideration of
the individual's welfare. This was an intriguing consideration for at
least two reasons. First, it was proposed by a management attorney.
Second, labor relations are traditionally thought of in terms of collective rights, where individual rights are subordinated to majoritarian
principles.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Upon passage of the Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter LMRAJ in 1947,
section 2(3) of the NLRA was amended to exclude supervisors from the definition of employees
and section 14(a) was added providing that:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or
remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this Act shall be
compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
17. Certain strikes, as well as union restraint or coercion against employees were made unfair
labor practices by amendments to the NLRA upon passage of the LMRA. See §§ 8(b)(1) and
8(b)(4) respectively.
18. Section 703(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20003-17 (1976), declared discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin by a labor organization
to be an unfair labor practice.
19. Brennan, supra note 1, at 148.
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First Labor Cases
While still serving as a state court judge, Justice Brennan faced his
first labor cases. However, during the seven years he served on a New
Jersey bench he recalls only three cases out of the hundreds that he
heard involving federal questions. Of the three, two involved labor issues, one a suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act, the other a
suit seeking an injunction. In a later case, Brennan circulated to his
brethren on the New Jersey Supreme Court an opinion sustaining an
injunction against peaceful picketing (an inauspicious start for individual rights!). The opinion, however, was withdrawn following a decision
by the Supreme Court that federal law preempted state regulation of
20
such picketing.
Upon coming to the Supreme Court, Brennan quickly affiliated
himself with the civil liberties cause and thus individual rights. 2' In
economic regulation cases Brennan normally voted with Black, Douglas, Warren and Clark, assuring the liberals a majority. Yet he was less
favorable toward union claims than those Justices. 2 2 However, his nu23
merous votes in favor of Federal Employers Liability Act claims,
clearly established his position as a "strong proponent of the underdog
in economic matters. ' 24 One commentator, recognizing Brennan's predilection towards individual rights, summed up his first year thusly:
"In cases involving economic issues [he] does not appear to be awed by
big business . . . His coolness towards big business is matched by an
apparent sympathy for the laboring man ... 25
Apparently during the first five months as a member of the
Supreme Court, Brennan decided more labor cases than he had in the
previous seven years. Between October, 1956, and February, 1957, he
authored seven of the Court's opinions; four were labor cases. 26 Three
20. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection o/Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 490 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Individual Rights].
21. In his second year on the Court, he dissented twenty-six times, in eighteen of which he
voted to sustain the position of a civil liberties claimant. Additionally, the status of the claimant
appeared to be important to him. For example, in two cases involving the issue of coerced confessions, Brennan voted to affirm the conviction of a white middle class woman whose confession
was made to sheriff's deputies known to the woman, but he voted to reverse the conviction of an
uneducated, mentally retarded black man who confessed when he believed he was threatened by a
hostile mob. See Heck, The Socialization ofa Freshman Justice. The Early Years ofJustice Brennan, 10 PAC. L.J. 707, 716-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Heck].
22. Id. at 717.
23. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
24. Heck, supra note 21, at 714.
25. Berman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Preliminary Appraisal, 7 CATH. L. REV. I, 15 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Berman].
26. Heck, supra note 21, at 717. The four labor cases were NLRB v. Local 449, Int'l Brother-

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

of them dealt with claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act
(FELA). His opinion in Rogers v. MissouriPacfic R.R. Co. ,27 "quickly
became the leading case [concerning FELA]. . . and an important precedent for the Court's proworker majority. ' 28 It clearly stated that an
injured worker was entitled to have a jury hear his case, and held that
"The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay dam'29
ages for injury or death due 'in whole or in part' to its negligence.
(Emphasis in original.).
Brennan's decision for the Court in United States v. duPont and
Co. ,30 caused one of the largest business separations in American his32
tory. 31 The thrust of the decision was that the Clayton Antitrust Act
applied to vertical mergers in which a corporation gets control of a
potential customer or supplier, as well as to horizontal mergers, in
which a corporation swallows up a competitor. 33 Brennan thus held
that the 23 percent stock interest which duPont held in General Motors
violated the Act. He wrote, "The fact that sticks out . . . is that the
bulk of duPont's production has always supplied the largest part of the
requirements of [General Motors]. The inference is overwhelming that
duPont's commanding position was promoted by its stock interest and
was not gained solely on competitive merit. '34 The test which Brennan
formulated to determine whether there was a violation of the Clayton
Antitrust Act essentially was whether there was a reasonable
probability that the takeover or merger would result in competitive and
35
trade restraints.
The duPont decision was not favorably received by business. In
fact, the editors of Fortune changed their preliminary favorable view of
the new Justice. They wrote, "The Brennan 'law' is basically an an'36
tibigness law. . . We are back to equating bigness with badness.
hood of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); Herdman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 518 (1957);
Webb v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 512 (1957) and Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352
U.S. 500 (1957).
27. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
28. Heck, supra note 21, at 715.
29. 352 U.S. at 507.
30. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
31. FRANK, supra note 2, at 127.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
33. Berman, supra note 25, at 9, citing United States v. duPont and Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590-92
(1957).
34. 353 U.S. at 605.
35. Id. at 607. Brennan's duPont opinion appears based on his subsequently expressed belief
that "perhaps the most basic economic policy of our society [is] ... abhorrence of monopoly."
Pan American World Airline Inc. v. U.S., 371 U.S. 296, 324 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. FORTUNE, July 1957 at 91-92. See Berman, supra note 25, at 11.
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From the foregoing, an appreciation of Brennan's interest in the
individual worker begins to emerge. His FELA opinions gave relief to
individual workers, and his duPont decision struck a major blow to big
business. Court watchers from that era began to piece together a composite view of the new Justice. Early on they recognized Brennan's
concern for the individual worker. It was a view which closely paralleled Brennan's 1946 formula. However, an examination of specific areas of labor law is more helpful in analyzing where and how the
individual is factored into that formula.
INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS

Justice Brennan's formula for achieving optimum conditions for
peaceful labor management relations required the imposition and
shouldering of responsibilities by the unions. However, individual welfare rather than management or union welfare was his fundamental
consideration. An examination of internal union affairs is helpful in
seeing how Brennan treats individual rights when compared to union
rules and regulations and majoritarian principles. The issues in this
area most frequently arise where an individual union member complains of unlawful treatment by the union, such as the assessment of
dues for political purposes, the imposition of discipline by the union
upon members for violations of union rules, and the enforcement of
union rules which limit the rights of members to participate in union
elections. These situations often create a direct confrontation between
the rights of the individual and the national labor policy. It is also
useful to determine the standard of judicial review that Brennan is willing to employ in reviewing the actions of the Secretary of Labor and of
internal union remedies. This area of labor law is a fertile field for
exploration, as Justice Brennan has written numerous decisions concerning these issues.
In InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street,37 section 2,
Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act 38 was challenged on First Amendment grounds by employees who objected to the use of union dues to
support political candidates and issues to which they were opposed.
The challenged section authorized the unions to negotiate within the
railway industry for union shop agreements, which would condition
continued employment upon union membership. Thus when such an
agreement was contained in a collectively bargained agreement, should
37. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
38. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1976).
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an individual member fail to render his periodic union dues he could
be out of a job. In order to work, some employees were forced to subsidize proponents of political views with which they did not agree.
In upholding Section 2, Justice Brennan began by utilizing what
he referred to as a cardinal principle of the Court, and applied a statutory construction which avoided the constitutional question. 39 Brennan
achieved this result by concluding that unions are not free to distribute
their funds in any manner they desire.
Keeping in mind the development of unionism in the railway industry, Justice Brennan carefully examined the legislative history of
Section 2, Eleventh.A° He found that Congress had given to unions,
through collective bargaining, "a clearly defined and delineated role to
play in effectuating the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor
relations in the industry."'4 1 Since this process requires the expenditure
of considerable funds, and since the union is required as the exclusive
bargaining representative to represent all employees fairly and equitably, the spreading of costs to all those who received the benefits of that
representation is therefore justified. 4 2 Brennan found that this was the
clear conclusion to which the legislative history points. He adds
though, that "One looks in vain for any suggestion that Congress also
meant in Section 2, Eleventh to provide the unions with a means for
forcing employees, over their objection, to support political causes
which they oppose." 43 Even the title of Part III of his opinion, "The
Safeguarding of Rights of Dissent,"" evinces a concern for individual
rights.
In Part III, Brennan evaluates the Congressional concern that
union shops might be used to abridge freedom of speech. To mollify
those concerns, Section 2, Eleventh, was amended4 5 to prevent the use
of the union shop as a means to force dissidents out of work or to discriminate against Blacks. The section as amended, thus prevented the
loss of employment when membership was not available to an individual on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to others,
and where membership was denied or terminated for any reason, other
than the failure to pay dues, fees and assessments where those reasons
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

367 U.S. at 749.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 760-61.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 765.
Act of Jan. 10, 1951, Pub. L. No. 81-914, 64 Stat. 1220 (1951).
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were not uniformly applied to others. 46
Although Congress did not explicitly detail the uses to which
union dues may be applied, Brennan construed the amendments, "as
not vesting the unions with unlimited power to spend exacted
money. ' 47 Although he did not specify how union dues were to be
spent, his general finding that dues were to be used to help defray the
administration expenses of the collective bargaining agreement precipitated the holding that Section 2, Eleventh is to be construed "to deny
the unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted
funds to support political causes which he opposes. ' 4 However, he
stopped short of "curtail[ing] . . .the traditional political activities of
49
. . .railroad unions."
In a subsequent case concerning the expenditures of union funds
on political campaigns, Justice Brennan once again utilized his cardinal
principle of statutory construction in determining whether the Labor
Management Relations Act5 0 abridged first amendment rights. In Pipefitters Local 562 v. UnitedStates'5 ' the Court considered the legality of
52
political funds under section 304 of the LMRA.
Pipe.ftters came before the Court following the conviction of the
local and three individual union officers for conspiracy to violate section 304. Though the case was reversed and remanded because of
faulty jury instructions, Justice Brennan made clear that the section did
not prohibit "a labor organization from making, through the medium
of a political fund organized by it, contributions or expenditures in
connection with federal elections, so long as the monies expended are
in some sense volunteered by those asked to contribute. '5 3 In what the
dissent termed an unnecessary "interpretative gloss" ' 54 on section 304,
Justice Brennan defined the attributes of a legitimate political fund:
We hold that such a fund must be separate from the sponsoring
union only in the sense that there must be a strict segregation of its
monies from union dues and assessments. We hold, too, that, although solicitation by union officials is permissible, such solicitation
46. 367 U.S. at 765.
47. Id. at 768.
48. Id. at 768-69.
49. Id. at 770.
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167, 171-197 (1976).
51. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976). The pertinent provisions of this section make it unlawful for a
labor organization "to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election. . . at
which Presidential . . .electors or a Senator or Representative . . . are to be voted for ..
§ 610 was repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 496 (1976).
53. 407 U.S. at 401.
54. Id. at 449 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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must be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a political purpose and that those solicited may decline
to contribute without loss of job, union membership, or any other
reprisal within the union's institutional powers. 55
This holding resulted from an evaluation of the legislative history, and
a conclusion that Senator Taft's analysis of the section, "reflected concern that a broader application of [the section] might raise constitutional questions of First Amendment freedoms . . .- 56 This was a
concern Justice Brennan obviously also shared.
However, as in an earlier section 304 case, 57 the Court did not bar
further prosecution, but rather remanded the case to the district court
for consideration of the sufficiency of the indictment. The cases thus
stand as upholding the right of an individual union member to make
personal choices regarding which candidates he will support for public
office, without being subjected to union pressure to back the "union
candidate". Considering Justice Brennan's concern for civil liberties,
his decisions in Machinists and Ptvefitters are entirely consistent with
each other, as well as with his formula. They also inure to the benefit
of the individual. In the area of internal discipline of union members,
however, under Brennan's views the individual does not fare as well.
The questions before the Court in NLRB v. Allis - ChalmersManufacturing Co. ,58 was whether a union committed an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A)5 9 of the NLRA by restraining or coercing
employees who wished to refrain from participating in a strike. Factually, the union had imposed fines upon member-employees who
crossed their picket line, and worked for the employer during an authorized strike. The union had also brought suit under contract, in
state court, to enforce the fine, at which time the company filed unfair
labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan noted that the words "restrain and coerce" contained in § 8(b)(1) were ambiguous. 60 Therefore,
he turned to the legislative history to determine whether the language
of the section proscribed the union's conduct. He also analyzed the
55. Id. at 414.
56. Id. at 409.
57. United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
58. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) provides "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . .. (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7." Section 7, (29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)) provides that "Employees shall have the right to
. . . engage in . . . concerted activities ....
and shall also have the right to refrain from any
such activities ....
"
60. 388 U.S. at 179.
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national labor policy, finding that exclusive representation "extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with
his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to
act in the interests of all employees."' 6' Because of this policy, the
Court had developed the duty of fair representation, and Congress had
enacted "a code of fairness to assure democratic conduct of union affairs" 62 by passing the Landrum-Griffin amendments in 1959.63 Justice
Brennan determined that:
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen
union to protect against erosion [of] its status . . through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. That power is particularly vital when the
members engage in strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and "[tihe power to fine or expel strikebearers is
essential if the union
is to be an effective bargaining agent ..
64
[citation omitted]
Looking to the legislative history, Brennan found that when Congress passed § 8(b)(l) in 1947, it did not intend to regulate the internal
affairs of unions. Such regulation was accomplished with passage of
the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959. Therefore, to say that the 1947
amendments "strip[ped] unions of the power to fine members for
strikebearing. . . is to say that Congress preceded the Landrum-Griffin amendments with an even more pervasive regulation of internal af65
fairs of unions."
Brennan then notes that § 8(b)(1)(A) cannot be read to allow expulsion from membership as the only discipline a union may lawfully
impose. Such a reading would authorize a harsher penalty for members of strong unions, where expulsion "visits a far more severe penalty
upon the member than a reasonable fine." 66 A weak union however,
may be forced to condone the members' disobedience rather than
forego the loss of membership. Then, reminiscent of his 1946 article,
he states that "it is just such weak unions for which the power to execute union decisons taken for the benefit of all employees is most criti'67
cal to effective discharge of its statutory function.
Due to the extraordinary results that a literal reading of the section
61,
62,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 180.
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
388 U.S. at 181.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 184.
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would produce, and the absence of legislative intent to regulate the internal affairs of unions, Brennan found that the proviso to § 8(b)
(1)(A), 6 8 "preserve(d) the rights of unions to impose fines, as a lesser
penalty than explusion, and to impose fines which carry the explicit or
implicit threat of expulsion for nonpayment." 69 Furthermore, he held
that enforcement of such awards by state courts was not proscribed by
the Act. 70 The collective interest was supreme.
The validity of union discipline upon members under § 8(b)(l)(A)
of the Act was considered twice again in the two terms following Pipefitters. In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Maritime and Shpbuilding
Workers, 7 1 the Court found that the union had engaged in an unfair
labor practice when it expelled a member for having filed with the
Board an unfair labor practice charge against the union, without first
exhausting internal union remedies. The issue arose when the member
filed a second § 8(b)(1)(A) 72 unfair labor practice charge following his
expulsion. Without examining the merits of the original complaint, the
Court found that the provision in the union's constitution which required exhaustion of internal union remedies before seeking relief from
the Board or the courts, was contrary to the plain policy of the Act.
Although the Act did not specifically bestow upon employees the right
to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board, policy considerations required that they be completely free to do so. The union's internal rule was coercive.
In Scofield v. NLRB, 73 the Court upheld a production ceiling imposed upon union members by the union, and the enforcement of the
ceiling by union fines. The ceiling was contained in the collectively
bargained agreement the union negotiated with the employer. Under
the contract, piecework employees 74 would be paid for no more than
the production of a fixed number of "pieces" produced per day.
Should an employee exceed that fixed number, he or she could "bank"
the extra pieces for days when the fixed number was not reached. 75
68. The proviso reads: "Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
69. 388 U.S. at 191-92.
70. Id. at 192.
71. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
72. See note 59 supra.
73. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
74. Piecework employees are paid for each unit they produce, rather than by an hourly wage.
75. For example if the contract fixed production at 100 pieces per day and an employee were
to produce 120 pieces one day, he would only need to produce 80 pieces the next day in order to
receive his maximum wages.
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However, when requested to do so by an employee the company would
make payments to an employee in excess of the ceiling where the employee's production exceeded the ceiling. Scofield was one such employee, and when he received, at his request, more pay than allowed
under the contract he was fined by the union. In upholding the discipline the Court held:
The union rule here left the collective bargaining process
unimpaired, breached no collective contract, required no pay for unperformed services, induced no discrimination ...and represents no
dereliction by the union of its duty of fair representation. In light of
this, and the acceptable manner in which the rule was enforced, vinit is impossible to say that it condicating a legitimate union interest,
76
travened any policy of the Act.
Here the union's interest was one of survival. In essence, when Scofield
requested payment based on his production, without regard to the contract, he was undercutting the very purpose of the union. Scofield was
becoming his own bargaining unit. Although Brennan did not write
the opinions in Shipbuilding Workers or Scofield, he predictably joined
in them both.
Scofield also held that § 8(b)(1) allowed a union to enforce a rule
"which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress
has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against
77
union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule."
The impact of this language was considered in NLRB v. Granite
79
State,78 and expanded upon in Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB.
Both cases involved the issue of whether the union committed a
§ 8(b)(1)(A) violation for fining employees who had been union members, but who had resigned during a lawful strike and then returned to
work. In both cases, Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinions, finding a violation.
The Granite State union had no rules specifying when a member
could resign. Six weeks after a lawfully called strike, two members resigned and returned to work. Within six months, thirty-one members
had done so. The union placed all on trial and imposed individual
fines equivalent to the wages each had earned while a strikebreaker.8 0
The Court held:
[Wihere ... there are no restraints on the resignation of members,
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

394 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 430.
409 U.S. 213 (1972).
412 U.S. 84 (1973).
409 U.S. at 214.
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we conclude that the vitality of § 7 requires that the member be free
to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May and
that his § 7 rights are not lost by a union's plea for solidarity
or by its
8
pressures for conformity and submission to its regime. '
In short, the Court held that where the member lawfully resigned "the
union has no more control over [him] than it has over the man in the
82
street."
In Booster Lodge, the union constitution expressly forbade
strikebearing but contained no provisions concerning resignations. In
rejecting the union's argument that its strikebearing proscription was
binding on employees who resigned from the union and returned to
work, the Court logically extended its earlier rulings and held that the
seeking of court enforcement of union fines for such activity was itself
83
an unfair labor practice.
Throughout this line of cases, Justice Brennan has been consistent,
upholding the union except when the union attempted to discipline an
employee who was no longer a union member and where the discipline
contravened the national labor policy. In the following two cases,
Brennan endorses the union's conduct as it relates to disciplining supervisor-union members. The central issue is whether such conduct restrains or coerces the employer in the selection of his grievance
adjusters, i.e., supervisors.
In FloridaPower & Light Co. v. 1BEW Local 641,84 Justice Brennan joins Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court that a union does not
violate § 8(b)(l)(B) 85 of the NLRA when it imposes a fine upon a supervisor-member who performs rank and file work for the employer
during a strike. The Board found the union guilty of an unfair labor
practice because the work performed "further[ed] management's interests."' 86 The Court did not agree. Turning its attention to the legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(B), the Court found that the clear focus of
Congress was to protect the employer from coercion in the selection of
his representatives in contract negotiations and grievance adjustments. 87 Performance of rank and file work falls into neither category,
81. Id. at 217-18.
82. Id. at 217.
83. 412 U.S. at 89-90.
84. 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1)(B) (1976). This section makes the restraint or coercion of "an
employer in the selection of his representativs for the purpose of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances," a union unfair labor practice.
86. 417 U.S. at 802.
87. Id. at 803.
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and thus the union was free to discipline supervisor-members who performed such work during a strike.
In another case involving the same section, Brennan once again
joined his Brother Stewart, this time in dissent. InAmerican Broadcasting Co. v. Writers Guild,88 the Court held that the union committed an
unfair labor practice when it fined a supervisor-member who crossed
the union picket line but performed only his regular supervisory duties.
The dissent, however, desired to expand the Florida Power decision
and allow a union the right to discipline its supervisor-members whenever they cross the picket lines. The dissent viewed the Court's opinion
as a "radical alteration of the natural balance of power between labor
and management. '89 The dissent persuasively pointed out that the
union "had no interest in restraining or coercing the employers in the
selection of their . . .representatives, or in affecting the manner in
which the supervisory employees performed those functions." 9° The
union was merely concerned with the enforcement of "the traditional
kinds of rules that every union relies on to maintain its organization
and solidarity in the face of the potential hardship of a strike." 9'
The dissent also pointed out that since the Act itself provides a
remedy for the employer there is no need to violate the internal affairs
of the union. Specifically, the employer may refuse to hire supervisors
who are union members. 92 The underlying theme of Scofield also appears present, that the supervisor may leave the union to escape the
rule, and is thus consistent with Brennan's earlier view limiting the
right of a supervisor to join a union. Essentially, the decision involves
the balancing of economic weapons, a balancing which the dissent felt
93
was a matter best left for congressional resolution.
Whereas the preceding cases dealt with the resolution of substantive rights under the Act, Boilermakers v. Hardeman94 considered the
scope of judicial review and the procedural requirement under
§ 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA. 95 The case arose following Hardeman's
88. 437 U.S. 411 (1978).
89. Id. at 438-39 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
90. Id. at 440 (emphasis in original).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 441. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
93. 437 U.S. at 442. See Modjeska, The Supreme Court and the Diversificationof the National
Labor Policy, 12 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 37, 56 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Modjeskal.
94. 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(5) (1976) provides that:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof
unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
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expulsion from the union following a union trial for having violated
articles of the local union's constitution and by-laws. 96 The charges
were precipitated by a fist fight he began with the union's local business
manager. Following exhaustion of internal union remedies, Hardeman
sued the union under § 102 of the LMRDA, 97 asserting that he had
been deprived of a full and fair hearing by the union. The trial judge
agreed, finding that there was no evidence that Hardeman had violated
the union's by-laws. This finding was based upon his strict construction of the local's by-laws to apply only to threats to the union as an
organization and not to personal affrays. 98 The circuit court affirmed,
and it was this construction which set up the reversal by the Supreme
Court.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan took issue not only with
this construction of the union's by-laws, but also with the lower court's
authority to act. He wrote:
We find nothing in the language or the legislative history of
§ 101(a)(5) that could justify such a substitution of judicial for union
authority to interpret the union's regulations in order to determine
the scope of offenses warranting discipline of union members. 99
He then went on to hold that the proper standard of review was merely
to ensure that "the charging party provide[s] some evidence at the disciplinary hearing to support the charges made.'' l o Additionally, Justice
Brennan found that a reviewing court could properly examine provisions of the union's regulations referred to in the charge, to determine
whether the union member was misled or prejudiced in the presentation of his defense; however, the courts could not "scrutinize the
union's regulations in order to determine whether particular conduct
96. Hardeman was charged with having violated an article of the local's constitution which
forbade attempting to create dissension or working against the interest and harmony of the union.
He was also charged with a violation of an article of the local's by-laws which prohibited the
threat or use of force against union officers to prevent them from carrying out their union duties.
401 U.S. at 236 n. 3-4.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976) provides that:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the
United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such
action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district court of the United
States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office
of such labor organization is located.
98. This finding was apparently based upon the decision by the Fifth Circuit in Boilermakers
v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968) a case which grew out of the same incident. The Fifth
Circuit construed the meaning of the local by-laws, and the trial judge in 1-ardeman followed that
decision. 401 U.S. at 242.
99. 401 U.S. at 242-43.
100. Id. at 246.
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may be punished at all."''
Brennan's holding that the union had presented some evidence of
misconduct exonerated the union's proceedings. The decision also
clearly indicates that in Brennan's view, individual rights must be balanced against the union's interest in self-government. Apparently, the
union proceedings here had not, as he said in 1946, "trample[d] upon
02
the rights of others."'
A final area to be considered in exploring Justice Brennan's handling of internal union affairs concerns union elections. Perhaps due to
his father's experiences and consistent with his own recommendations
made in 1946 that unions be required to operate under democratic procedures, Brennan has been sympathetic towards plaintiffs who have
sought that goal.
In Steelworkers v. Usery,'10 3 the Secretary of Labor brought suit to
invalidate the election of local union officers. The Secretary alleged
that the eligibility requirements to hold union office, set forth in the
international union's constitution, violated § 401(e) 10 4 of the
LMRDA.' 05 Under the provisions in question, a prospective candidate
must have attended at least one half of the local's meetings for the three
years prior to the election.
At the time of the challenged election, because of the rule, 96.5
percent of the members in good standing were ineligible to hold office.
Of 660 members, only 23 were eligible, of whom nine were incumbent
officers. ' 6 The union argued that the rule was reasonable because it
served a valid union purpose of encouraging attendance at union meetings, imposed no burdensome obligation on its members, had no entrenching effect in that it did not guarantee the reelection of current
10 7
officers, and assured the election of knowledgeable officers.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, had no problem countering
any of these arguments. He noted that the rule had obviously done
little to encourage attendance, and suggested that the best way to assure
the election of dedicated leaders is to leave the choice of leaders to the
101. Id. at 245.
102. Brennan, supra note I, at 145.
103. 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976). The pertinent portion of this section provides that in union
elections, "a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every
member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to...
reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed).
105. 429 U.S. at 306-07.
106. Id. at 307-08.
107. Id. at 308.
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membership in open democratic elections, unfettered by arbitrary exclusions. 0 8 Brennan held that the purpose of § 401(e) is to:
guarantee 'free and democratic union' elections modeled on 'political
elections in this country' where 'the assumption is that voters will
exercise common sense and judgment in casting their ballots' .. [It
is not designed merely to protect the right of a union member to run
for a particular office in a particular election. 'Congress emphatically
asserted a vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union
elections that transcends the narrower interest of the complaining
union member." 0 9
In striking down the attendance requirement, Brennan held that the
anti-democratic effects of the meeting attendance rule outweigh the interests urged in its support.110
Justice Powell's dissent, which was joined by Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, seemingly should have had an appealing ring to Brennan.
Its concern was that the invalidation of the rule could have a disruptive
impact on industrial stability. By striking down the rule, the possibility
of more militant union leaders placing greater demands on management could increase.
Nevertheless, as in Machinists v. Street and
P.ieftters, Brennan felt that the individual has the right to freely
choose his elected union leaders, just as there is even a broader public
12
interest in having free and democratic union elections."
Brennan's enthusiasm for such elections is also evidenced by his
decision for the Court in Dunlop v. Bachowski,'13 his dissent in Hodgson
v. Steelworkers,' 14 and by his joining Justice Marshall's opinion for the
15
Court in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers.
Bachowski was a defeated candidate for union office who, following exhaustion of union remedies, filed a complaint with the Secretary
of Labor alleging election violations. The Secretary investigated the
complaint but decided not to bring a civil action to set the election
aside. Bachowski then sued the Secretary to require him to sue the
union. The question before the Court was whether and to what degree
108. Id. at 310-12.
109. Id. at 309, quoting from Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968) and Wirtz v.
Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U.S. 463, 483 (1968).
110. 429 U.S. at 310.
111. See Edwards, The Coming of Age of the Burger Court: Labor Law Decisions of the
Supreme Court During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C.L. REV. 1, 59 (1977).
112. 429 U.S. at 310.
113. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
114. 403 U.S. 333 (1971).
115. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). Decisions by Justice Marshall are particularly helpful in analyzing
how Brennan would resolve similar issues. See Landever, Perceptionsof JudicialResponsibilityThe Views of the Nine Supreme Court Justices, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099-1109 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Landever].
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a decision of the Secretary concerning whether he will file suit under
section 402(b) of the LMRDA' 16 is reviewable.
Brennan held that since the statute relies upon the Secretary's
"special knowledge and discretion . . .for the determination of both
the probable violation and the probable effect, clearly the reviewing
court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for the decision of the
Secretary not to bring suit."' 1' 7 However, the Secretary's discretion
must not be exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Thus, to
enable the court to review the Secretary's decision, he must "provide
the court and the complaining witness with copies of a statement of
reasons supporting his determination."' 18 The court's review is then
"confined to examination of the reasons statement, and the determination of whether the statement, without more, evinces that the Secretary's decision is so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and
capricious."' 19 Furthermore, reviewing courts may not conduct "trial
type hearings" to determine the factual basis of the Secretary's
20
determination.
Although Bachowski can be viewed a victory for the individual it
is not of monumental proportions, because review is based solely upon
the Secretary's own statement. As one commentator has observed, it
would be a rare administrator who would knowingly submit a statement which would impeach his own action.' 2' Nevertheless, Brennan's
opinion does afford the individual union member some redress of
union action and the Secretary's followup.
The decision in Trbovich was also a victory for the individual
union member who had filed a complaint against the union concerning
election procedures. Although the Court held, consistent with Bachowski, that the Secretary of Labor has the exclusive authority to sue to set
116.

29 U.S.C. § 482 (b) (1976).

This section provides:

The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to
believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he
shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil acion against the
labor organization as an entity in the district court of the United States in which such
labor organization maintains its principal office to set aside the invalid election, if any,
and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote upon the removal of officers
under the supervision of the Secretary and in accordance with the provisions of this
subchapter and such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe. The court
shall have power to take such action as it deems proper to preserve the assets of the labor
organization.
117. 421 U.S. at 571.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 572-73.
120. Id. at 573.
121. See Bostosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term.- The Allocation of Power in Deciding Labor
Law Policy, 62 VA. L. REV. 533, 557 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bostosic].
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aside a union election under section 402(b) of the LMRDA, 12 2 once the
suit is filed the aggrieved union member is not prohibited from intervening. Thus, the individual is able to actively participate in the case,
and if nothing else it serves as an excellent therapeutic remedy for the
actual complainant. Justice Brennan, however, did not expect the complainant to participate in the case. This was apparent from his dissent
in Hodgson v. Steelworkers.

In Hodgson, the Court held that a suit brought by the Secretary
under section 402(b) must be based upon a complaint filed by a union
member.' 23 In his dissent, Brennan argued that the Court's decision
gave too much significance to the internal union exhaustion requirement of the Act. 124 In so arguing, Brennan relied heavily upon an earlier election case, Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Association, 125 in which
he authored the majority opinion. There he wrote: "[lIt is incorrect to
read [the exhaustion] provisions as somewhat conditioning [the Secretary's] right to relief once the intervention has been properly invoked."' 2 6 In Hodgson, Brennan returned to his old theme, stressing
that the "overall goals of the LMRDA is to insure free and democratic
elections."

27

The Hodgson dissent can be read as a clear concern for the individual. The majority placed the burden on the individual to allege all
facts which might reasonably constitute a violation of the Act. The
requirement seems inconsistent with the "special knowledge and discretion" of the Secretary which the Court had acknowledged in
Bachowski. On that mark Brennan is consistent. The Secretary, not
the individual union member, is the expert in the field.
This examination of Brennan's opinions dealing with internal
union affairs reveals an emergence of some patterns in Brennan's treatment of the individual in labor law. His concern for individual rights is
most prevalent where the union has applied coercive measures to a
122. See note 116 supra.

123. 403 U.S. at 341.
124. Id. at 333. Section 402(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1976) provides that:
A member of a labor organization(1) who has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of
such organization and of any parent body, or
(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within
three calendar months after their invocation,
may file a complaint with the Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging
the violation of any provision of section 401....
Section 401 deals with terms of office and election procedures.
125. 389 U.S. 463 (1968).
126. Id at 473.
127. 403 U.S. at 342.
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member, as where they have attempted to impose penalties for filing a
complaint with the Board or against individuals who desired to resign
their membership in the union. His deciqions also express a deep concern for the right of the individual to govern himself. However, when
an individual elects to utilize internal union remedies, Brennan is willing to defer to union self-government. Clearly however, Brennan has
showed the least tolerance towards individuals who attempt to remain
members of the union, but who by their actions have worked against
the collective interest.
ECONOMIC WEAPONS AND PROTECTED ACTIVITIES

Both unions and management employ economic weapons against
each other in their never ending "negotiating" processes. However, for
the most part, it is the individual worker who is caught in the middle.
Management actions impact upon him, and he is often the standard
bearer of collective action against his employer in the exercise of rights
under § seven of the Act. 128 Thus, although issues relating to use of
economic weapons most often arise in consideration of unfair labor
practice charges being filed by the employer against the union, and vice
versa, it is ultimately rights of individuals that are being vindicated or
restrained. For that reason an examination of decisions in this area of
labor law is beneficial in reaching an understanding of how Justice
Brennan treats the individual employee.
As in other areas of labor law, Justice Brennan's opinions concerning the use of economic weapons are numerous. It is a topic he also
discussed in his formula for achieving peaceful labor relations. In general, he has recognized the use of economic weapons as a legitimate
and necessary negotiating tool.' 29 Where unions have employed such
tools to obtain concessions from an employer, he has normally upheld
their use, noting in NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 30 for example, that
Congress had been rather specific in restricting the union's use of those
tools.' 3' Consequently, Brennan's decisions regularly include an exten128. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
129. Brennan, supra note I and accompanying text.
130. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
131. Id. at 498.

1024

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

sive discussion of the legislative history relative to the section of the Act
with which the case deals. His conclusions generally reflect a concern
for the free play of economic weapons, allowing the individual the right
to exert pressure on an employer so long as the pressure can be termed
concerted and protected.
In NLRB v. Drivers Local 639,132 the Court considered the question of whether peaceful picketing by a union which did not represent a
majority of the employees, for the purpose of compelling the employer
to bargain with the union as the employees' exclusive bargaining agent,
was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 13 3 The
union had previously been certified as the bargaining agent, but following a decline in union membership and a subsequent election, in which
the majority of the employees voted for no union, that status was lost.
The union then began peaceful picketing at the customer's entrance to
the employer's retail store, carrying signs which both informed the public that the company employed non-union help, and also solicited employee membership in the union. The picketing continued for six
months at which time the employer filed unfair labor practice charges
with the NLRB, claiming that the union was interfering with the em34
ployees' exercise of their section 7 rights.
Writing for the Court, Brennan held that recognitional picketing 35 by a minority union did not restrain or coerce the company's
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Indeed, the right to
try to persuade other employees to join the union for their own mutual
aid and protection was a basic right guaranteed by section 7.136 Furthermore, Brennan held that section 8(b)(1)(A) was violated only where
a union employed violence, intimidation, reprisals, or threats to achieve
this goal. The union's conduct had to go beyond the general type of
pressure upon employees inherent in an economic strike. 137 Brennan's
interpretation of the Act thus gave union members wide latitude in the
exercise of their rights, 138 and perhaps defined not only the parameters
of the restrictive language of the Act-that is, "restrain or coerce"-but
also the language he included in his formula concerning the need to
132. 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). See note 59 supra.
134. 362 U.S. at 276.
135. Recognitional picketing is designed to induce an employer to recognize a union as the
exclusive bargaining agent for the employees. 362 U.S. at 277.
136. Id. at 279.
137. Id. at 290.
138. The question of whether the union's picketing violated other sections of the Act was not
before the Court.
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prohibit unions from coercing and intimidating workers to join their
39
ranks. 1
Although Brennan was unwilling to find a § 8(b)(l)(A) violation in
the preceding case, he is not particularly interested in assisting unions
which do not represent a majority of a particular bargaining unit. For
example, he refused to join the Douglas-Black dissent in International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB.140 There the employer and
the union had entered into a memorandum of understanding in which
the union was recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for the
company's production and shipping employees. However, the union
did not represent a majority of those workers, although both the company and union representatives believed they did.' 4 The good faith
belief of the parties however, did not insulate the company and the
union from charges of infringing upon the employees' section 7 rights.
The Court found that scienter was not an element of the unfair labor
practice involved. 42 The dissent however, argued that a minority
union was entitled to represent its members, until such time as another
union was certified as having majority status. Brennan's position was
understandable. In essence, the action of the company and the union
had deprived the rank and file workers the opportunity to select their
own representatives. His formula had included considerations of selfgovernment.
In the October Term of 1963, Brennan passed upon the meaning
of section 8(b)(4), 14 3 and the proviso to that section in NLRB v.
45
Servette, Inc. 44 and NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers.
The question posed in Servette was whether the union violated
subsection (i) and (ii) of section 8(b)(4) 1 4 6 by asking managers of sev139. Brennan, supra note 1, at 148.
140. 366 U.S. 731 (1961) [Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.].
141. Id. at 734.
142. Id. at 735.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
144. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
145. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). [Hereinafter referred to as Tree Fruits].
146. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)-(ii) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part that it shall be
an unfair labor practice for a union:
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in,. . . a refusal in
the course of his employment to . . . handle commodities . . . or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either cases an object thereof is: . ...
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person . ...
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in
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eral supermarkets to discontinue carrying Servette's line of merchandise during the union's strike against the company. To assert economic
pressure during a strike against Servette, a wholesale distributor of specialty items to retail supermarkets, union representatives approached
individual supermarket managers and asked them to stop carrying
Servette's products. The union representatives also warned the managers that if they did not support the strike the union planned to distribute handbills at the stores, asking the public not to buy Servette's
products. Servette then filed unfair labor practice charges against the
union with the Board.
In upholding the union's economic strategy, Brennan first held
that a manager is an "individual" for the purposes of the Act. However, the union's conduct had not induced or encouraged the managers
' 47
"to strike against or refuse to handle goods for their employer."'
Thus, section 8(b)(4)(i) had not been violated. He next determined that
by merely asking the managers to stop carrying a line of products, coupled with the threat of distributing handbills encouraging a consumer
boycott of the struck products at his place of business, the union neither
threatened, coerced or restrained the managers to cease dealing in
Servette's products. "Rather, the managers were asked to make a man48
agerial decision which . . . was within their authority to make."'
Finding also that the merchandise that Servette distributed equated to
their "product," Brennan held that section 8(b)(4)(ii) had not been
violated.
The factual setting in Tree Fruits is similar. There, however, the
union initially sought consumer support rather than soliciting the support of supermarket managers. The union had called a strike against a
firm which sold Washington State apples to Safeway stores around Seattle, Washington. Coupled with the strike, two picketers were sent to
the customer entrances of each of over forty supermarkets. The picketing was peaceful and did not interfere with the employees of Safeway,
and was directed towards encouraging shoppers not to buy Washington
such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by
any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to
pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution. . ..
147. 377 U.S. at 50.
148. Id. at 51.
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State apples.149 Once again writing for the Court, Brennan upheld the
union's actions.
In Tree Fruits, Brennan held that the proviso to section 8(b)(4)1 50
did not prohibit picketing of a supermarket by a union which sought a
consumer boycott of a single struck product. To reach this conclusion,
Brennan had to get around the language of the proviso which excepted
from conduct proscribed by the section, "publicity, other thanpicketing
• . . [to] advis[e] the public.

.

that.

. .

products are produced by an

employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and
are distributed by another employer. . .

.",'1

Brennan began his analysis by finding that the Board's reading of
the phrase "other than picketing" to mean the outlawing of all picketing directed at customers at a secondary site was predicated on the
Board's reading of the legislative history of the Act. Under the Board's
reading, the type of picketing involved in this case always threatened,
coerced or restrained the secondary employer. 52 This reading required
that Brennan once again explore the legislative history.
That search resulted in the following discoveries. The general prohibition of § 8(b)(4) was "keyed to the coercive nature of the conduct,
whether it be picketing or otherwise."' 53 Furthermore, to avoid conflicts with the first amendment, the section was narrow in scope and
was aimed at isolated evils. Where peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites was involved there was only one evil which Congress
sought to prohibit. Such picketing was not to be used to persuade customers of the secondary business to stop trading with him, and thus
force him to stop dealing with, or to put pressure on the primary employer. 54 Understandably, Brennan found that Congress' protection
of some coercive conduct was not an indication that all consumer picketing was forbidden.

55

Brennan's findings led to his conclusion that "the legislative history.

. .

does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan

to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites."1 56 He
therefore characterized the union's picketing of the Safeway stores, asking the public not to buy Washington State apples, as an expansion of
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 59-61.
See note 145 supra.
377 U.S. at 59. (Emphasis in original).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 63.
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the site of the primary dispute and thus not coercive in nature. 157
Brennan was not however willing to go as far as Justice Black, who
concurred in the result. Black's reasoning was based on the belief that
section 8(b)(4) was unconstitutional under the first amendment. The
thrust of his argument was that the section banned picketing based on
the particular views expressed by the picketers. Thus, "while others are
left free to picket for other reasons, those who wish to picket to inform
Safeway customers of their labor dispute with the primary employer,
are barred from picketing - solely on the ground of the lawful informa' 58
tion they want to impart to the customers."'
Although Brennan's opinion does recognize the congressional concerns regarding the freedom of speech implication of section 8(b)(4),
his analysis did not deal with the constitutional issues. This can perhaps be explained for two reasons: Justice Brennan tries to avoid constitutional issues where statutory construction will allow it, 59 and he
concedes that picketing which calls for a total boycott of a secondary
employer should be prohibited.' 60 The decisions in Servette and Tree
Fruits, however, are permeated with his concern for the welfare of the
individual worker.
Justice Brennan's sensitivity to unwarranted control over economic weapons has not been a mere pretext to bolster labor's panoply.
In NLRB v. Brown Food Store,' 6 ' he wrote for the Court, finding that
the operators of six retail food stores did not commit an unfair labor
practice "by locking out their regular employees and using temporary
replacements to carry on business."'' 62 This action was taken in re63
sponse to the union striking one store of the multi-employer group.
In reaching this result, the Court rejected the finding of the Board that
this case was unlike Buffalo Linen' 64 because the employers acted "for
' 65
the purpose of inhibiting a lawful strike."'
Brennan compared the holding in Buffalo Linen to the facts under
consideration:
[Wie do not see how the continued operation of respondents and
157. Id. at 72.
158. Id. at 79.
159. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
160. 377 U.S. at 71-72.
161. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
162. Id. at 284.
163. This type of action is known as a whipsaw strike.
164. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) [Buffalo Linen]. This was one of
Brennan's first opinions for the Court. He held that employers could lock out their workers to
preserve the integrity of a multi-employer bargaining group.
165. 380 U.S. at 282.
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their use of temporary replacements imply hostile motivation any
more than the lockout itself; nor do we see how they are inherently
more destructive of employee rights. Rather . . . this was all part

the muland parcel of respondents' defensive measure to preserve
66
tiemployer group in the face of a whipsaw strike.'
He further noted that the effects of the employer's action are "no
different from those that result from the legitimate use of any economic
weapon by the employer."' 67 In short, Brennan held that the mere use
of such weapons does not constitute an improper motive for which the
operators could be found in violation of the Act.
Brennan has accepted this type of defensive maneuvering by business, 168 going so far as to join the Court's decision in American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB. 169 There the Court allowed the company to
lock out its employees after contract negotiations had gone to impasse,
noting that the right to strike does not carry with it the "right exclu' 70
sively to determine the timing and duration of all work stoppages."'
Justice Brennan has not, however, been as willing to condone purely
offensive measures by management.
In Beth IsraelHospital v. NLRB,17 1 Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, held that the hospital violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA *72 by enforcing a hospital rule which prohibited employees
from soliciting union support and distributing union literature during
nonworking time in the hospital's cafeteria. 73 The case arose after the
hospital gave a written warning to an employee who had distributed
union literature to other employees who were seated in the cafeteria.
The hospital found the literature objectionable because it questioned
the ability of the hospital to provide adequate care due to understaffing. 174 This hospital did allow solicitation and distribution in areas of
the hospital which were not patient care areas and were not open to the
public. Although the cafeteria was open to the public, a survey had
166. Id. at 284.
167. Id. at 286.
168. See Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court. 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 57, 67-74
(1965). What the Court is balancing here are economic weapons, not legal rights.
169. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
170. Id. at 310.
171. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (3) (1976). In pertinent part this section provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--(I) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 . ...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
173. 437 U.S. at 486.
174. Id. at 491.
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revealed that over a three day period, seventy-seven percent of the patrons were employees, and that the cafeteria area was frequently used
by the hospital to solicit charitable contributions, as well as to dissemi1 75
nate information to the employees.
In reaching the conclusion that the hospital had violated the Act,
Justice Brennan upheld the authority of the Board to establish rules
concerning employees' rights to communicate with each other about
self-organization at a jobsite. 76 Specifically, the Board had held that
"absent a showing that disruption to patient care would necessarily re177
sult if solicitation and distribution were permitted in those areas,"'
the hospital's rule could not stand.
Before the Supreme Court, the hospital argued that the Board's
decision concerning the hospital's solicitation rules was not entitled to
judicial deference because the establishment of those rules was "essentially a medical judgment outside the Board's area of expertise."' 178 As
he did in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 179 Brennan acknowledged a statutory
grant of power to someone other than the petitioner. He strongly endorsed the Board:
It is true that the Board is not expert in the delivery of health-care
services, but neither is it in pharmacology, chemical manufacturing,
lumbering, shipping, or any of a host of varied and specialized business enterprises over which the Act confers its jurisdiction. But the
Board is expert in federal national labor relations policy, and it is in
the Board, not the petitioner, that [Congress] vested responsibility for
developing that policy in the health-care industry.' 80
Additionally, Brennan rejected the argument that Congress intended to
entirely prohibit solicitation in the health care industry. He convincingly countered, "If Congress was willing to countenance the total...
disruption of patient care caused by strikes,. . . we cannot say it necessarily regarded appropriately regulated solicitation and distribution in
areas such as the cafeteria as undesirable."' 8'
Unlike Brown and its related cases, Beth Israel involves the balancing of rights: the right of the hospital to manage its own affairs
against the employees' section 7 rights. 8 2 The Court however has
tipped the scales, implying that in a modern industrial society free dis175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 500.
421 U.S. 560 (1975). See note 113.supra and accompanying text.
437 U.S. at 501.
Id. at 499.
Modjeska, supra note 93, at 61-62.
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cussion on labor related matters is essential. In short, during non-work
time and in non-work areas employees are entitled to freedom of
183
speech and association concerning employment matters.
The holding of the Court in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,184 is another
example of the collective interests of the employees outweighing those
of the company. Factually, the employees of Eastex, a paper products
manufacturer, were represented by a union. Preceding contract negotiations, the union sought permission to distribute a newsletter to the
employees. The newsletter generally urged support of the union, requested employees to contact their state legislators to indicate their opposition of a state right-to-work statute, and finally, noting that
President Nixon had recently vetoed an increase in the minimum wage,
encouraged the employees to register to vote. When the company refused the union permission to distribute the newsletter anywhere on
company property, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the Board, 8 5 asserting a violation of section 8(a)(1). 186 The Board in
turn found a violation.
In a decision by Justice Powell, in which Brennan joined, the
Court deferred to the Board's expertise, and held that where an employer could not show that his ban on solicitation and distribution of
union literature was needed to maintain discipline and production in
his business, an employer may not prohibit such union activities by his
employees in nonworking areas of company property during nonworking time. 8 7 The Court deferred again in applying this rule to union
literature covering topics beyond the immediate employer-employee
relationship, namely, a plea to have union members register to vote and
to write letters to their state legislators opposing the inclusion of a
"right to work" clause into the state constitution. These pleas were
found to be protected by the mutual aid and protection clause of section 7 of the Act. The Court looked to the Board's reasoning that because the plea to register to vote was related to criticism directed
towards a presidential veto of an increase in the federal minimum
wage, the topic was of "immediate concern to employees." Furthermore, the "right to work" plea "was protected because union security is
central to the union concept of strength of bargaining in other than
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 63.
437 U.S. 556 (1978).
Id. at 559-61.
See note 172 supra.
437 U.S. at 571.
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right to work states."'' 8 Thus, the material was found to be protected
by the mutual aid and protection clause of section 7 of the Act, and its
distribution could not be prohibited absent a showing by the company
that distribution of the materials would be prejudicial to the interests of
the company. 8 9
Central to the holding in both Eastex and Beth Israel was that an
employer may not suppress the right of employment-related speech,
either in location or content, unless he can demonstrate a real interference with his property interests. The decisions "give substantial reaffirmation to the rights of employees to discuss self-organization and to
communicate their position in labor disputes."' 90 Brennan's support
for the Court's decision is consistent with the views he expressed in his
formula concerning self-government and his opinions in Steelworkers v.
Usery concerning thepublic interest in having free elections.
Another related issue which has come before the Court several
times is the right of the employer or property owner to bar union members from engaging in organizational activity, standards picketing or
informational picketing on company or private property. Although
Brennan has authored none of these opinions he has consistently voted
to allow it. His position in Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza,'9 1 is a good example. 92 There, he joined Justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court that "peaceful picketing carried on in a location
open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment."' 93 In so holding, the Court ruled that members of the union
had been unlawfully barred from engaging in standards picketing
which took place immediately adjacent to a store in a privately owned
shopping center. Key to the holding was the fact that since:
the shopping center serves as the community business block and is
freely accessible and open to the [public] . . . the State may not delegate the power ... wholly to exclude those members of the public
wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a
consonant with the use to which
manner and for a purpose generally
4
the property is actually put.' 9
188. Id. at 569.
189. Id. at 575.

190. Modjeska, supra note 93, at 63.
191. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
192. In two subsequent cases, Central Hardware v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), and Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) the Court has found no violation of the Act. Brennan dissented in
both cases, adhering to the Logan Valley rationale.
193. 391 U.S. at 313.
194. Id. at 319-20.
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As inclined as Brennan is to approve of such activities, these cases
have primarily focused on a clash between the employee and management, or the union and management. However, in Emporium Capwell
Co. v. Western Addition Community Org.,195 Brennan was forced to
choose between the union and the individual in a case with important
Title VII ramifications.
Justice Brennan joined in Justice Marshall's opinion 196 for the
Court which held that an employer did not violate section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA by discharging two Black employees who picketed and handbilled the employer's store. They had urged a consumer boycott until
such time as the employer ceased his allegedly discriminatory employment practices. The employees' conduct occurred after the employer
had agreed with union representatives to look into the matter, and after
the employees had refused to participate in the contractual grievance
proceedings. Following the picketing on two successive Saturdays, the
two employees were fired. Their community organization then filed
97
section 8(a)(1) charges against the company with the Board.
The Board held that the picketing employees were demanding that
the company bargain with them as the representative of the minority
employees. The Board therefore held that the discharges did not violate the Act because "protection of such an attempt to bargain would
undermine the statutory system of bargaining through an exclusive,
elected representative. . .

.,,'9

The court of appeals reversed the Board, based on its recognition
that the national labor policy accorded a unique status to concerted
action against racial discrimination. The court concluded that a union
was required to seek remedies to discriminatory practices to the 'fullest
extent possible, by the most expedient and eicaciousmeans."'199
While sustaining the Board, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
elevated status that the eradication of discrimination enjoys in the national labor policy. However, the Court also noted that the former employees, who were discharged, were not discharged because they had
been trying to end racial discrimination. They were discharged because their picketing was designed to force the company to bargain
with them over the terms and conditions of employment. 200 The Court
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

420 U.S. 50 (1975).
See Landever, supra note 115, at 1099-1101.
420 U.S. at 53-57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59-60. Emphasis in original.
Id. at 60.
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then held that section 7 of the Act protects concerted activity to reduce
industrial strife by encouraging an atmosphere conducive to collective
bargaining. Concerted activity is not protected for the sake of an individual employee. 20' Quite simply, the national labor policy encourages
collective, not individual action. Quoting Brennan's opinion in AllisChalmers,202 the Court emphasized that the policy "extinguishes the
individual employee's power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in
the interests of all employees. ' 20 3 The Court concluded:
[Wjhile a union cannot lawfully bargain for the establishment or
continuation of discriminatory practices . . . ,it has a legitimate interest in presenting a united front on this as on other issues and in
not seeing its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by subgroups within
the unit separately pursuing what they see as separate
2 o4
interests.
In Emporium Capwell, the union was the real winner. Although
the Court concedes that the discharged employees may have had a
meritorious complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,205 when pursuing remedies under the NLRA, they must conform
their actions to the negotiated contractual grievance procedures-procedures which are formulated through the exercise of majoritarian
principles. While the decision does not further individual rights, it
does further the orderly settlement of labor disputes, and consistently
applies Brennan's own opinion in Allis-Chalmers.
In two other cases decided in 1975, Brennan's concern for individual welfare is readily apparent. Both cases concern an employer's authority to investigate his employees.
In NLRB v. Weingarten,206 the employer questioned an employee
about her reported thefts of food from the employer's lunch counter.
The employee requested union representation during the interview.
Although no representative was summoned, she was interviewed at
length. During the interview, she stated that "the only thing she had
'20 7
ever gotten from the store without paying for it was her free lunch.
Unfortunately, the company did not provide free lunches. Although no
disciplinary action was taken, she informed the union of the incident
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 61-62.
See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
420 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 70.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
420 U.S. 251 (1975).
Id. at 255.
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and they filed unfair labor practice charges, alleging a violation of section 8(a)(1)208 of the Act. The National Labor Relations Board concluded that the company had committed an unfair labor practice by
denying the employee's request that a union representative be present
during the interview. In short, the company's action denied the employee the mutual aid and protection guaranteed by the Act. The court
of appeals refused to enforce the Board's cease and desist order.
In an opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan once again deferred
to the expertise of the Board and upheld their determination. Brennan
found that the court of appeals had usurped the Board's authority in
holding that the Board's decision was foreclosed by earlier Board decisions and decisions of the courts of appeals. In Brennan's view, the
Board was merely adapting the Act to changing patterns of industrial
life. 20 9 Here the Board had determined that the employee had a need
for union assistance while being interviewed by her employer with a
view towards disciplinary action. While that interpretation of the Act
was not required by the Act, it was at least permissible under it; and the
Board's determination of a matter within its "special competence" was
subject only to limited judicial review.210 Brennan's opinion for the
Court went beyond mere deference, however; it clearly indicated that
he agreed with the Board.
The action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance of
his union representative at a confrontation with his employer clearly
falls within the literal wording of § 7....
This is true even though
the employee alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome; he
seeks "aid or protection" against a perceived threat to his employment security. The union representative . . . is however, safeguarding not only the particular employee's interest, but also the interests
of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain
that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing
punishment unjustly. The representative's presence is an assurance
to other employees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain
his aid and protection if called upon to attend a like interview. 2 t1
He further found that the Board's decision fulfilled the primary purpose of the Act, that is, to protect the worker's freedom of association
for mutual aid and protection. That purpose is achieved by eliminating
the inequities in the bargaining powers of employees and employers;
but where a lone employee is forced to attend an investigatory interview, which he believes could result in disciplinary action, the purpose
208. See note 172 supra.

209. 420 U.S. at 266.
210. Id. at 266-67.
211. LId. at 260-61.
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of the Act is defeated. 21 2 Indeed, such a lone employee "may be too
fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. ' '2 13 Brennan, therefore, held that the request for a union representative was protected
concerted activity.
In Weingarten, Brennan's focus was on the individual's right to
engage in protected concerted activity, but in InternationalLadies' Garment Workers v. Quality Manufacturing Co. ,214 the focus shifted to the
union's interest as well. In this case, the company discharged one employee (King) for refusing "to attend an interview with the company
president without union representation," another (Mulford) for "her
persistence in seeking to represent King at the interview" and a third
' '2 15
(Cochran) "for filing grievances on behalf of King and Mulford.
The Board found that the company had violated sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) 21 6 of the Act, but the court of appeals denied enforcement of the
Board's order. Following a recitation of the facts, Justice Brennan, relying on Weingarten, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
The Court, therefore, required reinstatement of all three employees.
Brennan found that the actions of all three were protected by section 7,
even though King had been the only employee the company had originally intended to discipline. This finding underscores the importance
of collective union activity. Mulford and the third employee were protected solely because they became involved with King's problem. Here
Brennan did not subordinate individual rights to an overriding union
interest. Rather, he enabled the individual to better protect his rights
through the concerted actions of others.
Finally, although in the two preceding cases, Justice Brennan
found that the Act protected the rights of several individual employees,
the case of Allied Chemical Workers' Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. 217 perhaps indicates that Brennan was protecting employees' rights
rather than the individuals' rights. In this case the factual situation
easily could have lent itself to a broad interpretation of the Act. The
company and the union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provided benefits to retirees. During the term of the contract, the company made changes in the retirees' benefits. The union
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
420 U.S. 276 (1975).
Id. at 277-78.
See note 172 supra.
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then filed charges with the NLRB, charging the company with a failure
to bargain, an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) 21 8 of the Act.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan held
that the company had no duty to bargain over those benefits, primarily
because retirees are not employees. 2 19 It was therefore improper to include them in the bargaining unit since retired employees "do not share
a community of interest [with active employees] . . . to justify inclusion
• . . in the bargaining unit." 220 The case provided a golden opportunity for Brennan to expand the coverage of the Act in favor of individuals who may need the most protection. He chose to follow the
unambiguous language of the Act, which was designed to protect the
rights of "workers."
Justice Brennan's decisions in the area of the use of economic
weapons and protected activities are largely consistent with his
formula, reflecting a balancing of union and management power. The
decisions also reflect a general concern for the individual employee,
allowing him to assert economic pressure on an employer, so long as
the pressure can be deemed concerted. Thus, he will not allow the individual employee to attenuate the bargaining unit or representative
union for his own interests. Neither will he allow the employer to corral an individual employee. Additionally, employees must be left free
to associate with one another on company, as well as public, property.
In short, however, his opinions reveal as much of a concern for union
solidarity as they do for the welfare of the individual employee.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Brennan's formula called for the prohibition of discrimination
based on race, creed or color. 22 ' His suggestions were expanded upon
when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed. Specifically,
section 703 of the Act made illegal employment practices which discriminated on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. The passage of this Act essentially opened up a subspecialty in labor law, that of "equal employment opportunity". A detailed discussion of this area of the law is beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief focus on but one area of discrimination reveals
Brennan's concerns for the Title VII claimant. Interestingly, Brennan's
218. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees ..
219. 404 U.S. at 166.
220. Id. at 173.
221. Brennan, supra note 1, at 148.
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formula did not suggest the prohibition of sex discrimination in employment. However, since passage of Title VII, Brennan has been the
judicial leader in the fight to eradicate it. In spite of his efforts, judicial
review of sex discrimination is not the subject of close judicial scrutiny,
as are classifications based on race and national origin. 222 However,
when attacked on equal protection grounds, sex discrimination is subjected to an intermediate standard of review, 223 questioning whether
the classification serves important government objectives and is sub224
stantially related to achieving those objectives.
One case, Schlesinger v. Ballard,2 25 arose outside the normal arena
which generates labor-management conflicts. Ballard was a lieutenant
in the Navy who, after more than nine years as a commissoned officer,
was being forced out of the service because he was not promoted to the
next higher rank. He brought suit, claiming sex discrimination, because female lieutenants in the Navy were not forced out for want of
promotion until the end of the thirteenth year of commissioned service.
This disparity was created by statute. Finding that male and female
naval officers were not similarly situated with respect to promotional
opportunities, the Court rejected Lieutenant Ballard's challenge. In essence, the Court viewed the statute as an affirmative action program,
providing "women officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement

programs.'

"226

One might think Brennan joined in that opinion. He did not. The
tone of his dissent questions why the Court takes account of the limited
opportunities for women in the Navy without questioning the constitutional validity of those limitations. 227 While acknowledging his belief
that affirmative action programs can help achieve equality for the
"needy segment of society long the victim of purposeful discrimination", 228 such a program was not needed in this case. In fact, the Department of Defense had conceded that the policy was no longer
needed. 229 Absent justification for the disparate treatment, Brennan
222. See Brennan's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Although he
wrote the lead opinion which found "classifications based on sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny." Id. at 688, only three other Justices subscribed to it.
223. Landever, supra note 115, at 1103-04.
224. See Brennan's opinion for the Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
225. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
226. Id. at 508.
227. See Bostosic, supra note 121, at 543.
228. 419 U.S. at 518, quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 517.
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could not vote to uphold it.
In Geduldig v. Aiello230 and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,2 3 1 the
Court considered the issue of whether employment disability plans
which covered all disabilities except pregnancy violated either the
equal protection clause of the Constitution or Title VII. In both cases
the Court held there was no violation because, "There [was] no risk
from which men are protected and women [were] not. Likewise, there
232
[was] no risk from which women are protected and men [were] not."
Brennan dissented in both cases.
Geduldig involved the constitutionality of a disability program administered by the State of California. Under the program, which covered persons in private employment, employees were required to pay
one percent of their annual salary, but not exceeding $85.00 per year to
the state. In return, the state paid disability benefits to employees who
were unable to work due to injuries or disabilities which were not job
related. In general, the plan covered all disabilities except those associated with normal pregnancies and child birth. The "insurance" program was funded entirely by employee contributions, and participation
in it was mandatory. 233 The facts in Gilbert are similar, however there
the plan was administered not by the state but by General Electric. In
both cases the programs were challenged by women who had been unable to work due to pregnancy and who were denied disability benefits.
The state plan was challenged on equal protection grounds, the company plan as a violation of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.234
In upholding the plan in Geduldig, the Court examined the plan
using a rational relationship test. The plan was found to be self sufficient and thus the Court concluded that the one percent contribution
bore a close relationship to the benefits paid out and the risks insured
by the program. Paying disability benefits for normal pregnancies
would involve a substantial increase in costs. Furthermore, the state
had a legitimate interest in maintaining a self sufficient program, and
holding down the cost for those who could least afford to pay. 235 In
230. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
231.

429 U.S. 125 (1976), reh. den., 429 U.S. 1079 (1976).

232. 417 U.S. at 496-97.
233.

Id. at 487-89.

234. Section 703(a)(1) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(l).
235. 417 U.S. at 495-96.
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Gilbert the Court relied on their holding in Geduldig, that the insurance
plan simply did not discriminate on the basis of sex.
In analyzing the state operated program in Geluldig, Brennan first
took issue with the fact that the Court had backed away from its earlier
holding in Frontiero v. Richardson,236 and without explanation had applied a lesser constitutional standard. While the court upheld the program because both men and women were mutually protected by the
coverage the program offered, Brennan argued that the program created a double standard by singling out for less favorable treatment a
gender-linked disability peculiar to women. However, men were protected against all disabilities.2 37 Applying a standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, Brennan found that, "[sluch dissimilar treatment of men and
women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to
one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination. ' 238 Finally, Brennan's dissent in Geduldig forecast how he would resolve the same issue
under Title VII. Conceding that the expanded coverage which he believed was constitutionally required would be more costly, he believed
that the financial impact of the coverage could be mitigated if employers would simply comply with Title VII by treating pregnancy-related
2 39
disabilities the same as other disabilities.
In Gilbert Brennan once again attacked the "mutually covered"
analysis used by the Court. He argued, "Surely it offends common
sense to suggest. . . that a classification revolving around pregnancy is
not, at a minimum, strongly sex related."2 40 Though only Marshall
bought his approach, Brennan was vindicated when Congress passed
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978. In passing the Act which
forbids the type plans the Court had approved, the House Report stated
'24 1
that Brennan had "correctly interpreted the Act.
In County of Washington v. Gunther,242 Brennan was once again
faced with interpreting Title VII. The question presented was whether
§ 703(h) 243 of Title VII was intended to bar all sex-based wage discrim236. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See note 222 supra.
237. 417 U.S. at 498-501.
238. Id. at 501.
239. Id. at 504 n.8.
240. 429 U.S. at 149.
241. House Report No. 95-948 11978] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4749, 4750.
242. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). In relevant part, this section provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer
to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
Section 206(d)(1) of Title 29 is the Equal Pay Act and provides in relevant part:
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ination complaints which did not allege a denial of equal pay for equal
work. Writing for the Court, in a five to four opinion, Brennan found
that no such bar was intended.
Gunther was one of several females who had been formerly employed to guard female prisoners in the county jail. The female guards
were paid substantially lower wages than the male guards in the male
section of the jail,244 furthermore they were paid lower wages than the
county's own survey indicated the jobs were worth. The wages of the
male guards were not similarly reduced. Gunther filed suit under Title
VII seeking back pay. The district court found that the work done by
the male and female guards was not substantially equal and thus the
females were not entitled to equal pay. The court also refused to allow
Gunther to present evidence that the county's pay scale resulted from
intentional sex discrimination, finding as a matter of law that sex-based
wage discrimination suits must satisfy the equal work standard of the
Equal Pay Act 245 before they can be brought under Title VII. The
court of appeals reversed that ruling and remanded the case with instructions that the district court hear Gunther's evidence. The case
246
came before the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari.
Brennan's interpretation of the reference to the Equal Pay Act in
§ 703(h) of Title VII is straightforward. He examines the Equal Pay
Act to determine what pay differentials it authorizes. He concludes
that the Act is divided into two parts, one defines how the Act is violated, and the second sets out the affirmative defenses to an apparent
violation. These four defenses authorize differentials in pay based on
seniority, merit, production, quality or quantity, or any factor other
than sex. Brennan's examination of the legislative history of § 703(h)
reveals no purpose for the reference to the Equal Pay Act other than to
incorporate the four affirmative defenses into Title VII.247 Thus a sexNo employer. . . shall discriminate. . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages.., at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex. . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex ...
244. The question of whether the statutory exclusion of females from guarding male prisoners
was not before the Court. 452 U.S. at 164 n.2. However in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), Marshall and Brennan dissented from the Court's conclusion that a similar exclusion in
the Alabama prison system constituted a bona fide occupational qualification, and thus upheld the
exclusion.
245. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). See note 243 supra.
246. 452 U.S. at 165-66.
247. Id. at 168-69.

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

based wage discrimination complaint under Title VII need not be
founded upon the "equal pay-equal work" standard of the Equal Pay
Act. 248 A further significant consideration in Brennan's opinion, which
kept open the court house doors for Ms. Gunther, is his reluctance to
interpret Title VII in a manner which would leave victims of discrimi2 49
nation without a remedy.
In conclusion, although these cases dealing with employment discrimination may be more appropriately considered a "class" concern,
as opposed to a concern for the individual employee, they are indicative of Brennan's commitment to civil liberties and the elimination of
discrimination against employees and prospective employees. That
concern has an obvious impact for individuals who belong to the "deprived minorities."
JUDICIAL ACCESS

&

ATTORNEYS' FEES

It is true ... that there has been an increasing amount of litigation
of all types filling the calendars of virtually every ... court. But a
solution that shuts the courthouse door in the face of a litigant with a
legitimate claim for relief. . . seems to be not only the wrong tool
but also a dangerous tool for solving the problem. The victims of the
use of that tool are most often the litigants most in need of judicial
protection of their rights - the poor, the underprivileged, the deprived minorities. The very lifeblood of courts is popular confidence
that they mete out evenhanded justice and any discrimination that
their meritodenies these groups access to the courts for resolution of 250
rious claims unnecessarily risks loss of that confidence.
As with internal union affairs, protected activities and employment
discrimination, the issues of access to courts and attorneys' fees, in context of labor law issues, are fruitful areas in which to examine Justice
Brennan's concern for individual welfare. From the above quotation
one would expect to find Brennan most eager to allow the individual
his day in court. Those expectations are borne out by his votes in Love
252
v. Pullman Co. ,251 and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.
In Love, Brennan joined the majority opinion of Justice Stewart.
The case centered on a procedural point, whether the petitioner had
complied with §§ 706(b) and (d) of Title VI1253 which require that state
commissions are to be allowed at least sixty days to resolve allegations
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 178.
IndividualRights, supra note 20, at 498.
404 U.S. 522 (1972).
421 U.S. 454 (1975).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(d) (1976).
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of discrimination and that charges are to be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within a specified number
of days from the date of the alleged discrimination, or within thirty
days after receiving notice that the state has terminated its proceedings.
The petitioner had merely submitted a "letter of inquiry" to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Upon receipt of the letter, the EEOC did not formally file it, but instead notified the state
commission of the "complaint." When the state waived jurisdiction the
EEOC proceeded with its own investigation. In a subsequent action,
the court of appeals held that the charge "had not been filed .. in
conformity with the requirements of the Act."'2 54 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the intent of the Act had been met. To require a
plaintiff to file a second complaint after state court proceedings had
terminated "would serve no purpose other than the creation of an addi'2 55
tional procedural technicality.
The Court was not as liberal in Johnson, however. There the
Court found that although the remedies under Title VII were related
and directed towards the same ends as those under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866256 (§ 1981), the remedies were separate, distinct and independent. Therefore, the filing requirements of Title VII are not related to,
nor do they toll the running of the statute of limitations under
§ 1981.257 Since that section has no federal statute of limitations the
Court held that the state statute would apply.2 58 The effect of this decision barred Johnson's § 1981 cause of action.
Justice Brennan disagreed. He, with Douglas, joined Marshall's
dissent. Their dissent centered on equity principles, and on the legislative intent of Title VII and § 1981 to end discriminatory employment
practices. 259 Marshall states, "Statutes of limitation are designed to insure fairness to defendants by preventing the revival of stale claims in
which the defense is hampered by lost evidence, faded memories, and
disappearing witnesses, and to avoid unfair surprise. None of these
254. 404 U.S. at 524.
255. Id. at 525-26.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). This is most frequently referred to as § 1981, and it provides
that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and extractions of every kind, and to no other.
257. 421 U.S. at 461, 466.
258. Id. at 462.
259. Id. at 470. (Marshall, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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factors are present here.

' 260

He also notes that "the administrative

remedy . . to conciliate complaints is frustrated by the majority's requirement that an employee file a § 1981 action prior to the conclusion
of the Title VII conciliation efforts in order to avoid the bar of the
26
statute of limitations." 1
The distinction between the majority and the dissent is that the
former takes a more legalistic approach while the latter takes one
which is sympathetic to the "humane and remedial nature of civil
rights legislation. '262 The dissent also persuasively argues that the policy reasons requiring a state statute of limitations are amply protected
by filing charges with the EEOC. Additionally, the dissent's position
would strengthen the role of the EEOC by minimizing unnecessary and
costly litigation.263 In general, however, the position each side takes
achieves the same result, allowing all claimants to proceed under both
Title VII and § 1981. All claimants that is, except Willie Johnson.
Again it is easy to understand Brennan's vote. Not only is Johnson out of court, but the majority suggests what Brennan perceives to
be an unnecessary litigatory step. Additionally, as with Love, Johnson
was a Title VII claimant, where emphasis is on private enforcement.
Brennan however, has not been as quick to open the court house doors
2 64
in other cases.

In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,265 the Court held that § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act 266 reflects a federal policy re-

quiring exhaustion of contract grievance procedures prior to instituting
a state court action for breach of contract. In the Court's opinion by
Justice Harlan, joined in by Brennan, "unless the contract provides
otherwise, there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the
union the opportunity to act on his behalf. ' 267 This result was required, the Court found, due to Congress' expressed preference for use
of such procedures to settle disputes and stabilize the "common law" of
the plant.268 Harlan wrote:

Union interest in prosecuting employee grievances is clear. Such activity complements the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative . . . In addition, conscientious handling of grievance
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 473.
Id. at 472-73.
Bostosic, supra note 121, at 552.
Id.
See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
379 U.S. 650 (1965).
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
379 U.S. at 653.
Id.
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claims will enhance the union's prestige with employees. Employer
interests . . . are served 269
by limiting the choice of remedies available
to aggrieved employees.

The effect of this decision was that Maddox was left without a
remedy. He had brought suit seeking severance pay nearly three years
after the company had closed down the mine where he had worked.
The grievance procedures required that grievances be filed within 30
days after the date on which the grievance occurred. Though facially
the case appears to be a victory for management, the real victor was the
union. The Court conditioned the right of the individual to file suit
against his employer, allowing such actions only where he had first
sought union assistance. This requirement was later an important consideration when the Court imposed a duty upon unions to fairly represent those employees who, under Maddox, are required to use the
270
contractual grievance procedures.

Maddox has been factually distinguished in a recent case authored
by Brennan. In Clayton v. InternationalAuto Workers, 27 1 Clayton's

right to bring suit under § 301272 against both his union and former
employer without having first exhausted his internal union remedies
was upheld. Key to Brennan's opinion was the fact that exhaustion of
union remedies could not have resulted in a reactivation of Clayton's
grievance, or of awarding the relief Clayton sought.
Clayton had been dismissed by his employer for a violation of a
plant rule. In conjunction with the union, a grievance was filed in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and
processed through the union's request for arbitration. However, when
the union withdrew its request for arbitration it did not notify Clayton
of the withdrawal until after the time for requesting arbitration, under
the contract, had expired. Although the union's constitution required
Clayton to exhaust internal union remedies before seeking redress from
a court or agency, he bypassed those procedures and filed suit. His
complaint charged the union with a breach of its duty of fair representation, and the employer with a breach of the collective bargaining
27 3
agreement.
Brennan refused to allow either to defend against the suit based on
Clayton's failure to exhaust internal union remedies. Both the union
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
451 U.S. 679 (1981).
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
451 U.S. at 683.
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and employer argued that an exhaustion requirement would, "enable
unions to regulate their internal affairs without undue judicial interference and. . . promote the broader goal of encouraging private resolu'27 4
tion of disputes arising out of a collective bargaining agreement.
Brennan rejected these arguments. First, he found that Clayton's
complaint did not involve a strictly internal matter within the United
Auto Workers, but rather was based on a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation. Furthermore, the provisions the union and employer sought to enforce were not bargained for and were not even
mentioned in the collective bargaining agreement. Second, Brennan
focused on that part of the National Labor Policy which "encourages
private rather than judicial resolution of disputes arising over collective
bargaining agreements. ' 275 Noting that exhaustion may lead to private
settlement, Brennan declined to impose a universal exhaustion requirement. Rather he found that courts may exercise their discretion and
decline to require exhaustion where any one of three conditions are
met:
[F]irst, ...
union officials are so hostile to the employee that he
could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, ...
internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to award him the full relief he
seeks under § 301; and third, . . . exhaustion of internal procedures
would unreasonably delay the employee's 27opportunity
to obtain a ju6
dicial hearing on the merits of his claim.
In Brennan's view, Clayton's claim meets the second condition.
He thus upholds Clayton's right to file suit. Again as in Love and Johnson, Justice Brennan refuses to impose a totally unnecessary litigatory
step, finding that the policies underlying Maddox, requiring exhaustion
of internal union procedures, are furthered only where those procedures can remedy the complaint of the aggrieved individual employee.
To hold otherwise would require the individual to waste time and resources chasing after "a necessarily incomplete resolution of his claim
prior to pursuing judicial relief. ' 277 Characteristically, Brennan refuses
to place that burden on the individual.
The preceding cases, as well as his comment in Gunther,2 78 reveal
Brennan's willingness to allow an aggrieved employee an opportunity
to present his case. As eager as that employee might be to sue, there is
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 687.
Id. at 689.
Id.
Id. at 696.
See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
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a good chance he might not be able to afford it. We thus begin our
examination of Brennan's willingness, or lack thereof, to allow attorneys' fees.
We begin our search in Piggie Park.279 There, in a per curiam
decision, the Court held that when the Civil Rights Act of 1964280 was
passed it was evident "that the Nation would have to rely in part upon
private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the
law."' 28' These successful litigants were in essence performing the function of private attorneys general. Therefore, to encourage suits against
discrimination, and "not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately
advance arguments they know to be untenable," one who obtains an
'28 2
injunction under the Act should "ordinarily recover attorneys' fees.
In Hall v. Cole, 283 the Court considered the question of whether
attorney's fees may be awarded under § 102 of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act. 284 The case arose following Cole's expulsion from his union for introducing a set of resolutions at a union
meeting, alleging various instances of undemocratic actions and shortsighted policies on the part of union officials. Cole exhausted his union
remedies, and then filed suit alleging that the union had violated his
freedom of speech. The district court agreed, issuing an injunction restoring Cole's membership in the union and it awarded him $5,500.00
against the union for attorneys' fees. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed, finding that "Cole was merely expressing his views on current
union policy and urging other members to change that policy. . . He
urged no individual member to violate union rules or to take any action
not approved by the union membership. ' 285 The Supreme Court
affirmed.
In writing for the Court, Justice Brennan noted that in the absence
of contractual or statutory authority attorneys' fees traditionally are not
279. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
280. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
281. 390 U.S. at 401.
282. Id.
283. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
284. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976). This section provides:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the
United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such
action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district court of the United
States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office
of such labor organization is located.
285. Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1972).
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allowed. 286 However, in the interest of justice, federal courts have the
equitable authority to award such fees. Thus under the broad language
of § 102-that suit may be brought for "appropriate" relief-the
2 87
awarding of attorneys' fees was permissible.
Brennan justified the award of such fees under a common benefit
theory. Specifically, where the successful litigant "confers a substantial
benefit on the members of an ascertainable class . . an award . . .
will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them. ' 288 Brennan held that since Cole had rendered a "substantial service to his
union" by the vindication of his own right to free speech, he had dispelled the "'chill' cast upon the rights of other [union members] ....
Thus . . . reimbursement of respondent's attorneys' fees out of the
union treasury simply shift[ed] the costs of litigation to 'the class that
has benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it
brought the suit.' ",289
Looking to the legislative history, Brennan found that some opposition arose to § 102 on the grounds that the individual wage earner
would have to foot the litigation expenses for such suits. 290 It appeared
though that no member of Congress was opposed to allowing equitable
relief.29' He also rejected the union's claim that Cole's actions were in
part motivated by his own political ambitions, and thus evidence of bad
faith on his part. Brennan wrote, "Title I of the LMRDA was specifically designed to protect the union member's right to seek higher office
within the union, and we can hardly accept the proposition that the
exercise of that right is tantamount to 'bad faith.' "292 Nor did the
union's good faith belief have any bearing on the award of attorneys'
29 3
fees under the common benefit rationale.
The underpinnings of Brennan's decision seem entirely consistent
with his formula. Not only does the opinion benefit the individual
union member, but the opinion also addresses Brennan's concerns of
the unions' self-government. Significant also is the emphasis Brennan
places on the fact that in such cases the union itself derives important
benefits. Although Brennan sided with Cole, his subsequent refusal in
286. 412 U.S. at 4-5. This "traditional" approach is known as the "American Rule," first
annunciated in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
287. 412 U.S. at 4-5.
288. Id. at 5.
289. Id. at 8-9.
290.

105 CONG. REC. 195 (1959).

291. 412 U.S. at 13. See 105 CONG. REC. 15548 (1959) (Rep. Elliot); 105 CONG. REC. 15864 el.
seq. (Rep. O'Hara).
292. 412 U.S. at 14.
293. Id. at 15.
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IBEW v. Foust 294 to allow punitive damages against a union, suggests

that in Cole, Brennan's primary concerns were "collective" and not
"individual".
In Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Sociey, 295 the sole issue
before the Court was the award of attorney's fees to the Society on the
basis of a private attorney general theory which followed their successful blockage of the issuance of permits which would allow development
of the Alaska oil pipeline. Although not a labor law case, it helps to
explain Brennan's opinion in Hall v. Cole. In Alyeska, Brennan, along
with Marshall, continued to advance the equitable power of federal
courts; however they found themselves in the dissent. Justice White,
writing for the Court, traced the development of the American Rule
and concluded that absent statutory authority "federal courts cannot
award attorneys' fees." 296
Brennan and Marshall favored a more expansive interpretation of
the equitable powers of federal courts, and proposed that fees should
be awarded where:
(1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily
shared by the general public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's
pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any, would not normally justify
incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shifting that cost to the defendant would297effectively place it on a class that benefits from the
litigation.
The majority states that this proposal "is not the private attorney
general rule, but rather an expanded version of the common-fund approach ... ,"298 However, the majority does not question the holdings or rationale of Hall v. Cole. In short the majority is unwilling to
require a defendant to pay attorneys' fees where society is the beneficiary, but will require payment where the class of beneficiaries is "small
in number and easily identifiable" and the benefits could be "traced
with some accuracy,.

.. and.

. .

the costs could indeed be shifted...

to those benefiting. '299 Since most labor plaintiffs will fall into this
latter class, the effect of 41yeska on labor law should be minimal.
While there was substantial disagreement as to the equitable powers of federal courts in 4lyeska, the Court had no problem in reaching
294. 442 U.S. 42 (1979). In Foust, Brennanjoined the Court's plurality decision establishing a
per se rule against awarding punitive damages against a union.
295.

421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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Id. at 269.
Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 264 n.39.
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a decision in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC.3°° There Justice
Brennan joined the Court's opinion affirming the denial of attorney's
fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case. 30 1 The Court relied
on the dicta from Piggie Park,30 2 that the plaintiff is the "chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority' ".303 In so doing the Court rejected the argument that
a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees on the same basis as
a prevailing plaintiff. The Court held that such a rule,
would substantially add to the risks [inherent] in most litigation and
would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Hence, a plaintiff should
not be assessed his opponent's attorneys' fees unless a court finds that
his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, 3 or
that the
4
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. 0
In essence this decision merely restated a recognized exception to
the American rule. The holding is also consistent with Brennan's affinity for the economic underdog.
The issue of the states' sovereign immunity arose in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer.30 5 There Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment of the
Court, that under Title VII courts may award backpay and attorneys'
fees to prevailing plaintiffs in actions against a state. The Court's rationale was that Congress' action in passing the Civil Rights Act of
1964 under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment waived the "shield of foreign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment. ' 30 6 In
his concurrence however, Justice Brennan took the position that the
States have no sovereign immunity to waive by virtue of their accepting
307
statehood.
While Fitzpatrick upheld the legality of awarding attorneys' fees
against states when suit was brought under Title VII, Hutto v. Finney30 8
did so when suit was brought on constitutional grounds. Not surprisingly, Justice Brennan joins the Court's opinion that "the substantive
protections of the Eleventh Amendment do not prevent an award of
attorneys' fees against the [State]. ' 30 9 The Court's reasoning was based
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

434 U.S. 412 (1978).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e through 2000e-15 (1976).
390 U.S. 400 (1968).
434 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 422.
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Id. at 448.
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on two findings. First, the State's defense to the suit was evidence of
bad faith. Second, the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of
1976, 3 10 set aside the States' immunity from retroactive relief in order
to enforce the fourteenth amendment. "When it passed the Act, Congress undoubtedly intended to. . . authorize fee awards payable by the
States when their officials are sued in their official capacities." 31 1
Though Brennan's support was not surprising, his concurrence endorsing the Court's reasoning in Fitzpatrick was. He had concurred in Fitzpatrick on the grounds that states had no sovereign immunity to waive.
The importance of these cases however, is that Brennan has repeatedly voted to award attorneys' fees to the economic underdog.
This fact is not surprising considering Brennan's disapproval of
"shut[ting] the court house in the face of a litigant with a legitimate
claim for relief."' 31 2 For if a plaintiff has little or no funds, and there is
no likelihood of recovering attorneys' fees, the door, though not locked,
may be too difficult to open.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the preceding cases does not lead one to the conclusion that Justice Brennan's primary concern in labor relations is the
"welfare of the individual." At least not in the literal sense of the term.
There are those cases in which Brennan allows the individual employee-plaintiff to prevail over the union. In those cases however,
Brennan's reliance on broader public policy considerations dictate the
result. Thus, the employee may freely participate in union elections, he
may voice his dissatisfaction with union policies, he may leave the
union, he may challenge the effectiveness of the union's representation
of his individual grievance, and he may prevail in having the union
foot the bill in a court challenge of its own policies.
In those cases where an individual challenges management, Brennan typically upholds the actions of the employee, where that action is
concerted and thus protected. However, the individual employee will
not prevail at the union's expense. Thus the employee may not bargain
with management, thereby weakening the bargaining unit; further he
must give the union the opportunity to resolve his grievances.
Brennan's opinions subrogate the individual employees interests to
those of the majority. Quite clearly, they reflect an interest in protect310. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
311. 437 U.S. at 693-94.
312. Individual Rights, supra note 20, at 498.
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ing union solidarity, but since the unions represent the collective interests of the individual workers, particularly where principles of selfgovernment are strictly enforced, the label of "pro-worker" appears to
fit. His role in protecting those interests is manifested in his decisions
which subordinate individual rights to the unions' interests. They reflect a concern for strong unions.
In short, Brennan appears to believe that the best way to guarantee
the welfare of the individual is to guarantee the existence of a strong
union.

